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DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS
STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR VALUATION AND
PURCHASE OF SHARES OF DISSENTING
SHAREHOLDERS
T HERE is ample authority that at common law the unanimous
consent of the shareholders was required to sell the corporate
assets and to liquidate and dissolve the corporation,' although
Warren has suggested that the rule might have been otherwise.?
Most states, however, now have statutory provisions permit-
ting a certain percentage of the shareholders to vote a sale of the
entire assets and a subsequent voluntary dissolution.
The importance of such statutes permitting less than unanimity
for voting dissolution is readily seen because of the difficulty
encountered in securing the representation of all the outstanding
shares at shareholders' meetings; the strictness of the common-
law rules on the majority shareholders was hampering corporate
growth. Other similar actions now permitted rather widely are
consolidation and merger, reorganization, and other fundamental
changes in the corporate organization.
On principle, it is easy to justify such statutes. One individual,
or a small minority of shareholders, should not be able to block
majority action. Although minority shareholders have certain
interests, the majority shareholders also have interests which
should be protected from an oppressive or contrary minority.
I Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. Ch. 578 (N. Y. 1861) ; Myerhoff v.
Bankers' Securities, 105 N. J. Eq. 76, 147 At]. 105 (Ch. 1929) ; Kean v. Johnson, 9 N. J.
Eq. 401 (1853); 6 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1931) § 2942;
1 HILDEBRAND, TEXAS COR'ORATIONS (1942) § 64. As to unanimous consent not being
necessary when the corporation is insolvent or in failing condition, see Geddes v. Ana-
conda Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590 (1921).
2 Warren, Voluntary Translers ot Corporate Undertakings (1916) 30 HARy. L. REV.
335. Prof. Warren states, at 337, that the case from which the statement of the common
law gets its source is Ward v. Society of Attornies, 1 Collyer 370 (1844), where the
majority of the shareholders were proposing to give away the assets and reader the stock
valueless. See also Note (1932) 19 VA. L REv. 166.
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And in connection with these new "majority rights" statutes, many
legislatures gave to the shareholders dissenting from certain
majority action the right to ask for an appraisal and compulsory
purchase of their shares by the corporations.' As one judge has
suggested, with regard to such statutes granting the majority the
right to sell the corporate assets,
"In compensation for the lost right, a provision was written into the
modern statute, giving the dissenting stockholder the option to com-
pletely retire from the enterprise and receive the value of his stock in
money. ' 4
It is the purpose of this note to inquire, in cases when this
sort of a compromise between the interests of the majority and the
minority is carried out according to the statutory procedure,
whether the appraisal statutes have been effective to do justice
and protect the rights of both parties.
Twenty-five states now have some statutory provision for the
valuation and purchase of the dissenter's shares by the selling
corporation. One of the first enactments of this nature was passed
in England in 1862.' Many of the statutes in the United States
have been modeled after the early English statute. Levy, charac-
terizing the statutes as being "for the most part crudely drawn,"
has observed that they "have left in their wake a host of prob-
lems. Even the elemental question of who are included in the class
entitled to payment is not clearly answered. '
3 In those states that have statutes providing for the sale of assets, without statutory
provisions for appraisal of the dissenting shareholders' stock, it has been suggested that
the dissenter is not given the appraisal right either because small minorities are object-
ing for the purpose of harassing the corporation or else because there is deemed to be
wisdom in the action of large majorities. This may be especially true in those states
requiring action by 80 per cent of the outstanding stock.
4Chicago Corporation v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 Atd. 452, 455 (1934). These
statutes are constitutional. Miller v. Canton Motor Coach, Inc., 58 Ohio App. 9.1. 16
N. E. (2d) 486 (1937) ; also Note (1932) 79 A. L. R. 626.
525 & 26 Vict., c. 89, § 162 (1862).
6 Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment (1930) 15 CORN.
L. Q. 420. For a discussion of other problems raised by the appraisal statutes in addition
to the problem of valuation see Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under
Appraisal Statutes (1931) 45 HARv. L Rmv. 233.
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The statutes are nt uniform in their Wording as to the type
of value which the dissenter shall be paid. The statutes use
variously the terms "value,"' "fair value,"" "fair cash Value,"
"real value,"'* "full and fair value,"' "market value,"" and
"market value, but not less than book value according to the last
balance sheet,""; and one statute provides "fair value" with
"practice and procedure . . . [to] be, so far as practicable, the
same as that under the eminent domain laws of this state."" One
court has treated all such terms as synonymous in this connec-
tion."
CoNq. (Gen Stat. 1930) § 3384, as amended by Laws 1945, art. 365, Supp. 717h;
IDA. CODE (1932) § 29-149; INn. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1933) § 25-239; M_ REv. STAT.
(1944) c. 49, § 81, 84; MASS. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 156, § 46, p. 1968; MONT. REy. CIv.
CooE (1935) arts. 6005, 6006; N. Y. (McKinney's Law Ann., 1940) Stock Corp. § 20;
S. C. CODE or LAWS (1942) § 7705; VT. PuB. LAws (1933) arts. 6009, 6010; WASH Rv.
STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 380341, as amended by Laws 1939, c. 143, § 7.
Mn. Put. LAws ANN. (Flack, 1939) art. 23, § 38; Mo. G"r. Bus. CoRP. ACT (1943)
§ 72; N. H. REv. STAT. (1942) c. 274, 1 75; ORE. LAws ANN. (1940) § 77-263; TiFNN.
CODE (1932) § 3748.
9 LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1939) tit. 14, art, 1132. Dissenters have right to demand fair
cs-h value only when the action complained of was authorized by less than 80 per cent.
A vote of two-thirds of the shareholders can authorize sale of the assets. Mich. Act 327
(P. A. 1931) § 57; OHIO GEN. ConE (1940) § 8623-65; VA. CODE (1942) art. 3820a.
10 IOWA CODE (1946) art. 491.23 requires unanimous consent for a voluntary disso-
lution, or a lesser number if provided in the charter. Article 491.25 gives the dissenter to
the renewal of the charter the right to be paid the real value of his stock. There is RO
provision for appraisal for sale of assets.
11 R. 1. GEN. LAws (1938) c. 116, art. I, § 55, 56.
12 Ky. REv. STAT. (1946) art. 271-415 (4) ; N. J. REv. STT. (1937) tit. 14, c. 3-5.
13 N. M. REv. STAT. (1941) § 54-229, 231. See 2 BONBICIGHT, VALUATION OF PROP-
ERTY (1937) 827, to the effect that these provisions are too absurd for comment. In Borg
v. International Silver Company, 11 F. (2d) 147, 152 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), Judge Hand
said, "The suggestion that the book value of the shares is any measure of their actual
value is clearly fallacious..."
14 ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 37, § 157-73. See Ahlenius v. Bunn & Hum-
phreys, Inc., 358 Ill. 155, 192 N. E. 824, 95 A. L R. 913 (1934), where the Supreme
Court mentioned eminent domain only in connection with the procedure involved, but
based value upon the elements generally used by the other courts
Approximately fifteen states have statutory provisions providing for the sale of the
corporate assets with no provisions for appraisal of the dissenters' shares. A large part
of these states have provisions, however, for the appraisal of dissenters' shares to corpo-
rate merger or consolidation. Among these states are Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, and others. It is easier to
justify the appraisal of stock of those dissenting to consolidations and mergers than those
dissenting to voluntary sale of assets.
15 Chicago Corporation v. Mands, note 4 supra. at 455.
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The economists, writing on "value," uniformly give varying
definitions of the term and formulas for determining it, depend-
ing upon the purpose for which the "value" is to be used. Thus,
"There is market value of securities which is a matter of fact, the
price at which securities change hands in the market place, and this
value is recorded as matters of fact. Another value is investment value.
The analyst is constantly comparing the market value with the invest-
ment value to ascertain whether or not the market value is too high or too
low. The market value exists only at the time of the sale. The invest-
ment value continues over a longer period of time.""'
Other uses of the term for which the economists give varying
definitions and formulae for determination are fair liquidation
value, fair replacement value, and fair reproduction value. Val-
uation is also necessary for taxation, insurance, and many other
purposes too numerous to mention. Consequently, it is necessary
at the outset to keep clearly in mind the type of value and use
of the term which one is. considering. Even then, the mere use
of the term in a single limited sense is not free from difficulty.
The problem involved has been thus clearly indicated:
"Value is subjective; it is based on individual human experience.
Hence when an individual tries to find an objective standard or criterion
for his own personal values, he is confronted with an endless confusion.
Values change from hour to hour; value is different according to the
standards of experience and the standards oi judgment. Consequently,
when attempts are made to set up legal postulates to control economic
value-such postulates as original costs or the cost of reproduction-
nothing but uncertainty and contradiction results. In the end the test
of value is pragmatic-where the judgment of most men meet? ... such
terms as 'value,' and the more specific terms 'market value,' 'normal
market value,' and 'basic market value,' are verbal symbols portraying
attempts to reach an objective standard of value in a world where value
exists only as the subjective judgments of separate individuals."1
None of the statutes attempt to define "value" or to give a
formula to be followed. The statute usually prescribes the pro-
16 Clifford, Evaluation of Corporate Securities (1938). For the various factors deter-
mining investment values, see id. at 14.
IT See 1 DEWINr, FINANCIAL POLICY Or CORPOATIONS (4th ed. 1931) 285.
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cedure to be followed only in such matters as the appointment
of appraisers, appeals, and making payment.
The courts, in interpreting these statutes, have applied dif-
ferent tests and elements of value in arriving at the resulting
figure to be paid. As has been observed by one writer,
"Most the decisions reveal a sharp contest between the dissenters who
have insisted that their shares be appraised at 'intrinsic value' and the
corporation, which has contended that the appraisal be limited, at most,
to 'market value'.""s
In reading the various state statutes giving the dissenter the
right to demand an appraisal and purchase of his shares at "fair
value," the courts must ask, "What is the legislature trying to do
for the dissenter? What type of 'value' does the legislature have
in mind?" The legislature obviously does not mean that the dis-
senter receive only the amount of money that he has paid for
his shares.
The problem which the appraisal statutes create is one where
no precise rules for determining the value, whatever the descrip-
tion used, can be laid down.1 "The very nature of the case pre-
cludes proof of value and damage with the precision of mathe-
matical computation."2 ° To appreciate fully the operation of these
statutes, then, it is necessary to consider specific cases dealing
with the problem; consideration should be given to cases involv-
ing both sale of assets and mergers because of the similarity in-
volved and the tendency of courts to apply the same tests to
both situations. 1
In considering a New Jersey statutory provision for "full mar-
ket value" to the shareholder dissenting from a merger or con-
solidation, the New Jersey court said:
1s See BONBRICHT, op. cit. supra note 13, at 828.
19 Matter of Fulton, 257 N. Y. 487, 493, 178 N. E. 766, 769, 79 A. L IL 608 (1931).
20 Jones v. Missouri Edison Electric Co., 233 Fed. 49, 52 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). This
case was in the courts almost a decade, seeking valuation of the dissenters' shares.
21 Miller v. Canton Motor Coach, Inc., note 4 supra.
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"It was proper to appraise according to market value and not accord-
ing to the speculative value of various properties and other interests of
the corporation."1
22
Bonbright has criticized this test, saying:
"The 'market value test' is utterly inapplicable.... the fatal objection
to the 'market test' is that it reflects the influence of the very sale or mer-
ger against which the dissenter is seeking a remedy. The market does
not wait until the corporation action has taken place before it discounts
the event." 2
1
The New Jersey statute now provides that the "full market
price without regard to appreciation or depreciation in conse-
quence of merger shall be paid the dissenters."2 Other states also
have similar provisions, but.how effective such provisions are
is somewhat doubtful.
Most of the courts in interpreting the "value" statutes have
rejected use of "market value" as a sole standard, although it is
considered in connection with other factors. In Cole v. Wells,2"
the court said:
"The 'value of the stock' means not merely the market price if the
stock is traded in by the public but the intrinsic value to determine
which, all the assets and liabilities must be ascertained .... the arbitra-
tors must resort to the books ... although books may fail to exhibit true
financial condition. Fair value is to be ascertained as if liquidation had
been voted and all the corporation property after payment of the debts
had been marshalled for the benefit of all the stockholders."
The court said nothing about "good will" or "going business,"
which will be discussed hereafter. The valuation theory followed
in Cole v. Wells has been called the "hypothetical dissolution
theory."
In the recent case of Matter of Fulton, the court said:
"To require them (the dissenters) to accept less than a fair market
22 Prall v. United States Leather Co., 6 N. J. M. 967, 143 Atd. 382 (1928), af'd with-
out op. 106 N. J. 602, 146 At. 916.
23 See BONBI.GHT, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 828.
24 N. J. R-v. STAT. (1937) tit. 14, c. 3-5.
28 224 Mass. 504, 513, 113 N. E. 189, 191 (1916).
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value for their stock would be a distinct injury. It is true that there may
be cases where the stock has a fictitious market price. To require the
corporation to pay the market price of the stock owned by the dissent-
ing stockholders would work a hardship on the corporation and the
remaining stockholders.
Under such circumstances the market quotations should be consid-
ered but not accepted as decisive of a fair market price. The market
quotations at the time of the dissent may, in certain instances, reflect
an expectation of increased value as a result of the proposed sale. A dis-
senting shareholder is not entitled to share in an enhanced value of
stock due to the sale which he opposed. Market quotations are, there-
fore, to be considered only in so far as they reflect a reasonable basis for
estimating market quotations which would probably have continued if
a sale had not been made . .."6
This case has been generally cited, with approval, as the proper
approach to determining the value of the dissenter's shares. This
case involved the disapproval in a merger and it appears that the
above is possibly dictum as the question involved was whether
or not the preferred shareholders who dissented should be al-
lowed to share in the accumulated surplus. The theory of the
Fulton case, as opposed to the "hypothetical dissolution" theory,
has been designated the "continuous investment" theory or the
"hypothetical market value of a continuous investment."
Some courts say that since the stock cannot properly be valued
at prevailing market price, its fair value must be estimated by
reference to the value or fair market value of the underlying cor-
porate assets. Such a statement may mean that the shares must
be valued as a continuing interest in a going business; 2 on the
other hand it could mean as if the corporation were being dis-
solved, the assets sold to the majority interest at a fair valuation,
and the resulting cash proceeds distributed to the security holders
26 See note 19 supra. Bonbright prefers the theory of the Fulton case.
27 See BONBRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 13, at 834.
28 Jones v. Miswouri-Edison Electric Co., note 20 supra; American Seating Co. v.
Bullard, 290 Fed. 896 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923) ; Chicago Corporation v. Munds, note 4 supra;
Robinson, Dissenting Shareholders: Their Right to Dividends and the Valuation of Their
Shares (1932) 32 COL. L Rgv. 60, 75.
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in accordance with their contract rights in the event of a voluntary
liquidation.29
. The Delaware court has been somewhat more articulate in
analyzing the element of value. In Allied Chemical and Dye Cor-
poration v. Steel and Tube Co., 0 the court outlined the elements
of value as follows: earning capacity, the investment value, which
is largely determined by the rate of dividends, the regularity with
which they have been paid, the possibility that they will be in-
creased, the selling price of stock of like character, the amount
of preferred stock in comparison with the common stock, the size
of the accumulated surplus applicable to dividends, the record of
the corporation, and its prospects for the future."
Some courts have added "good will" as an element to be con-
sidered in arriving at a valuation. In Seaich v Mason-Seaman
Transportation Co.,32 the New York court allowed the "good
will" to be capitalized in arriving at the value of the stock. The
court held that the value could be determined by multiplying
the average annual net profits and deducting therefrom the in-
terest on the capital invested. 3
Several recent cases show the difficulty which the courts often
29 This view was adopted in Prall v. United States Leather Co., note 22 supra.
30 14 Del. Ch. 1, 64, 117, 368, 120 Ati. 486, 122 Atd. 142, 127 Atl. 414 (1925).
31 Bor4aRtcrlH, op. cit. supra note 13, criticizes this case at p. 815 as "one of the most
unfortunate opinions in the recent history of minority.stockholder law. Its artificial dis-
tinction between the question of a fair sale price and the question of the wisdom of the
sale itself, has no support in economic theory. The price at which property can be sold
is always an essential factor in determining the wisdom of the sale, and the two problems
are merely restatements of a single question of sound business policy." Query, whether
it is the court's function to be governed by economic theory as to the wisdom of the
sale, or whether the court is to be governed by the statutory provisions that give the right
to the majority of the shareholders to sell their entire assets, if they so choose, with the
court seeing that equity is done between the conflicting interests?
32 170 App. Div. 686, 156 N. Y. Supp. 579, afl'd without op. 219 N. Y. 634, 114 N. E.
1083 (1916).
3 "The determination of the number of years is not a question of law but one of fact
dependent upon the evidence in each action with respect to the nature and character of
the particular business." Van Au v. Magenheimer, 115 App. Div. 84, 100 N. Y. Supp. 659,




have in applying standards and tests of value."" In each case
considerable time was necessary for the appraisal and prolonged
and expensive litigation was engaged in. Moreover, the disagree-
ment among the judges in a single case indicates the latitude of
opinion possible in applying the statutory formula. In Roessler
v. Security Savings and Loan Co.,"5 the court said:
"The fair cash value ... means the intrinsic value of the shares deter-
mined from the assets and liabilities of such corporation, upon consider-
ation of every factor bearing upon value."
This case (involving a merger) was commenced in September
1943. The corporation had offered $25.00 per share and the dis-
senters asked $160.00 per share. The trial court instructed the
appraisers upon many of the factors involved, in addition to the
"willing buyer-willing seller" test. The upper court stated that
the trial court erred in the instruction by making the "willing
buyer-willing seller" test the basic factor; that it had over-empha-
sized this factor in preference to others. The appraisers had
found the value to be $43.50 per share. On February 28, 1947,
the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. Almost four
years have passed and the court is still trying to find the "fair
cash value" of 1741/a shares of Security Savings and Loan Co.
stock. Three judges dissented, saying that the evidence showed
that for the years 1937-1943 this stock had ranged from $15.00
to $22.50 per share and that the $43.50 per share value found
by the appraisers was a "fair cash value."
The case of Lebold v. Inland Steel Co.,36 offers similar evi-
dence that the problem becomes exceedingly involved when the
court commences to apply judicial standards to arrive at the fair
value of the dissenters' shares. The Steamship Corporation was
a West Virginia corporation and 80 per cent of its stock was
8 For a recent case that summarizes a number of the "value" cases, see Ahlenuis v.
Bunn and Humphries, Inc., note 14 supra.
33....Ohio . 72 N. E. (2d) 259 (1947).
3682 F. (2d) 351,125 F. (2d) 369, 136 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943), cert. denied,
320 U. S. 787 (1943).
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owned by the Steel Company. The facts indicated that all the
Steamship Corporation business came from the Steel Compafiy,
at competitive rates. "Desirous of stopping the' golden flow of
dividends" (over $100 annually on $100 par value shares), the
Steel Company made an offer of $700 per share for the $100 par
value stock. This offer was refused. The Steel Company then
voted to dissolve the Steamship Corporation, selling the assets to
the Steel Company. This action was authorized under West Vir.
ginia law. The dissenters to this action then brought suit in the
federal court for damages because of the alleged fraud arising
from the dissolution of the Steamship Corporation. After trial in
the lower federal court, the case was appealed. The circuit court
of appeals returned the case to the trial court to determine the
value of the dissenters' shares, based upon various elements, one
of which was the value of the business as a going concern. In the
new trial, the dissenters presented thirty-two charts, ratios, analyt-
ical surveys, arriving at values varying from $2,885 to $5,689 per
share. The Steel Company, capitalizing 11 years average earnings
at 10 per cent, computed the value of each share to be $1,289. On
the basis that the Steel Company would have entered into compe-
tition with the Steamship Corporation, the Steel Company pre-
sented figures of $779.24 per share. What was termed "expert
opinion" varied from $224.90 to $3,200 per share. The trial
court, in accordance with the circuit court's direction as to fixing
the value, found the value to be $2,350 per share. Upon appeal
from this decision, the circuit court concluded:
"After mature and careful analysis of all the evidence, therefore,
the court finds that it does not justify a finding of value of the shares
in excess of $1,350.00 each or in allowance of damages in excess of
the difference between the value and the amount the dissenters have
received." 3"
The "careful analysis" to which the court refers is not related in
the opinion so it is impossible to determine just what standards
'1136 F. (2d) 876,878 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943).
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or guides the court finally used in arriving at its figure. Further,
there was never disclosed in any of the opinions the figure that
the dissenters had received as a result of the sale and dissolution.
The assets of the Steamship Corporation consisted of three ships.
The case was in the court for some eight years."'
CONCLUSION
The problem of arriving at procedures adequate to protect the
minority's interest against an unscrupulous majority is as yet
unsolved, in spite of the statutory provisions for appraisal and
forced purchase.
It is submitted that when one buys shares of a corporation, he
knows, or should know, that the corporation is managed by the
majority, that he exercises power in the management in ratio to
the number of shares he owns or the proxies he can control. The
court, in exercising its equitable powers, protects the minority
when it is apparent that the majority is taking unfair advantage
of the minority, either through fraud, mismanagement or other
devices familiar to a corrupt majority. For protection from these
practices, the minority needs no statute as equity will assume
jurisdiction.3
Most of the writers upon this subject seem to have assumed
that the usual majority is taking advantage of the minority. The
writer feels that the commentators who champion the cause of the
dissenters are perhaps overlooking other interests, those of the
majority. Those interests should also be protected against dis-
sipation by stockholders suits."
When, in their vote, the majority decides that the corporate
assets should be sold, there being no evidence of fraud or a
38 See also in re General Realty and Utilities Corporation ....... Del. Ch. 52 A.
(2d) 6 (1947). This case was in court for almost three years.
39 See 4 PoME..oY, EQUIJry JURISPRUD-.NCE (5th ed. 1941) §§ 1094, 1095.
40 The dissenters can be just as guilty of "bad faith" as the majority. For a case
where a shareholder dissented to the merger of the corporation, then bought additional
shares and attempted to receive the appraised price for them also, see Graves Y. Pitts-
burgh Consolidation Coal Co., 355 Pa. 224, 49 A. (2d) 344 (1946).
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clear case of underselling, the minority should receive pro rata
the share that the majority shareholders receive. "All questions
involving the exercise of business judgment to be decided by
the stockholders are to be decided by a majority vote.... When
to stop is as much a question of business judgment as how to
proceed. Financial embarrassment is not the only legitimate busi-
ness reason for such transfer.1""
In Manning v. Brandon Corporation,"' the court said:
"The statute (appraisal) should be construed liberally in favor of
the stockholder, so as to carry out the manifest theory of the act, and
to save harmless the stockholder from all costs and expenses in obtain-
ing the value of his stock at the time of the consolidation, and interest
thereon from 30 days thereafter."
But isn't the court unduly extending its protection to one side
when they take this attitude? If the majority is exercising good
faith in the sale, why should the minority be given an opportunity
to fasten expensive litigation, delays, costs of appraisers and ap-
praisals, and adverse publicity upon the majority?
A further difficulty with the statutes providing forced sale and
appraisal is that they operate to the financial advantage of the
minority at the expense of the majority. Is the method of taking
into consideration the estimated future earnings which won't be
earned, capitalizing "good will" which will cease to exist for the
corporation upon the sale of the assets, fair and equitable to the
other party to the suit? If the corporate assets are sold intact
to be continued under new management, the vendor corporation
obviously was paid for this good will in the consideration re-
ceived."' In this event, the assets to be shared are enlarged, so that
41g See WAum, op. cit. supr note 2, at 357. "In the absence of usurpation, fraud, or
oss negligence, courts of equity will not interfere at suit of dissatisfied stockholders to
overrule and control discretion of directors on questions of corporate management,
policy, or business." Rettinger v. Pierpont, 145 Neb. 161, 15 N. W. (2d) 393 (1944).
42 163 S. C. 178, 186, 161 S. E. 405, 408 (1931). This makes a convincing argument
why the majority should attempt to settle out of court.
41 The writer admits that this statement can be subject to close examination where
the vendee corporation is controlled or is interested in the vendor corporation. See Gar.
rett v. Reid-Cushion Land and Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 Pac. 1044 (1928).
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the dissenters can be paid for that part of the "good will" which
their shares helped to create. If the corporation is not to be con-
tinued by the vendee as a going business, then why should the
dissenters have a profit on some non-existent "goodwill" and "go-
ing business" theory? A legal reason advanced for capitalizing
this "going business" and adding it to the value of the dissenters'
share is that there is an implied contract between the minority
and the majority that the corporation will continue until the end
of the term stated in the charter. But should the court find such
an "implied contract?" The statute giving the majority the right
to sell the assets, as well as being a statute, is a term of the con-
tract by which shareholders buy and hold their shares. Why isn't
this said to be the contract instead of the highly fictional "implied
contract?"
Finally, it may be inquired how effective are the appraisal
statutes when years are required to appraise the value of the dis-
senters' shares.
A promising approach to the problem is that adopted in the
South Dakota statute" which provides that a two-thirds vote of
the shares can authorize a sale of the corporate assets. This dis-
solution is under the supervision of the court. It also provides"'
that all who object to such dissolution shall appear in court and
protest with the provision that "This action shall be deemed an
equitable action, without jury, to hear and determine the rights
and interests of all parties to the action in the assets of such cor-
poration." This statute appears to be one where all the interests
of all the shareholders can be adequately protected without the
necessity of an appraisal statute and its resultant expensive and
time consuming litigation.
Edwin P. Homer.
4 S. D. CoDE (1939) art. 11.0902.
45 Id., art. 11.0911.
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